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Abstract
This research demonstrates how promoting the environment can negatively affect adoption of energy
efficiency in the United States because of the political polarization surrounding environmental issues. Study 1
demonstrated that more politically conservative individuals were less in favor of investment in energy-efficient
technology than were those who were more politically liberal. This finding was driven primarily by the
lessened psychological value that more conservative individuals placed on reducing carbon emissions. Study 2
showed that this difference has consequences: In real-choice context, more conservative individuals were less
likely to purchase a more expensive energy-efficient light bulb when it was labeled with an environmental
message than when it was unlabeled. These results highlight the importance of taking into account
psychological value-based considerations in the individual adoption of energy-efficient technology in the
United States and beyond.
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This research demonstrates how promoting the environment can
negatively affect adoption of energy efﬁciency in the United
States because of the political polarization surrounding environ-
mental issues. Study 1 demonstrated that more politically conser-
vative individuals were less in favor of investment in energy-
efﬁcient technology than were those who were more politically
liberal. This ﬁnding was driven primarily by the lessened psycho-
logical value that more conservative individuals placed on re-
ducing carbon emissions. Study 2 showed that this difference has
consequences: In a real-choice context, more conservative individ-
uals were less likely to purchase a more expensive energy-efﬁcient
light bulb when it was labeled with an environmental message
than when it was unlabeled. These results highlight the impor-
tance of taking into account psychological value-based consider-
ations in the individual adoption of energy-efﬁcient technology in
the United States and beyond.
Climate change presents a major challenge to our current levelof energy consumption. Much attention has been given to the
development of energy-efﬁcient technology as a way of addressing
the problem of global warming and reducing the cost of energy
use for consumers, but the demand for energy efﬁciency has not
met expectations (1, 2). There are a number of potential road-
blocks to the adoption of energy-efﬁcient technology. People do
not know the cost and energy savings associated with different
technologies (3–5), and climate change is not viewed as an im-
mediate threat requiring action now (6, 7). In addition, people
tend to have short time horizons and discount the future hyper-
bolically, so that the upfront costs of switching to a new tech-
nology, even when it results in long-term net savings, can deter
investment in more expensive energy-efﬁcient products (8).
Given these issues, one strategy for making energy-efﬁcient
technology attractive to consumers has been to focus on its en-
vironmental beneﬁts (9). For example, a 2010 North American
advertising campaign for the Toyota Prius (arguably the best-
known hybrid car) emphasized its environmental upside by tell-
ing viewers that “the world gets fewer smog-forming emissions”
with a Prius, resulting in “harmony between man, nature, and
machine.” Similarly, the ENERGY STAR website (jointly run by
the United States Department of Energy and the Environmental
Protection Agency) promotes energy-efﬁcient products as pro-
viding ways for people to “save energy and ﬁght climate change.”
Because these messages explicitly emphasize environmental bene-
ﬁts, they likely resonate well with individuals who value protecting
the environment. However, this emphasis on the environment might
detract from the appeal of energy efﬁciency among individuals
who do not want to be associated with environmental concern.
This research investigated whether relying on environmental
concern to promote energy-efﬁcient technology may, in fact,
present an additional roadblock to increasing demand by deter-
ring otherwise interested consumers from purchasing these
products because of themessage’s (unwanted) value connotations.
“Value” is deﬁned as the importance individuals place on an issue
or concern, which can result in either attraction to or repulsion
from associated targets (10–12). This deﬁnition refers speciﬁcally
to the psychological valuation of an entity (its perceived impor-
tance) rather than its economic valuation (its monetary worth; ref.
11). Accordingly, our focus is on the inﬂuence these psychological
valuations have on individuals’ judgments and choices. In two
experiments, we examined the importance individuals place on
energy-related concerns as a function of their political ideology
and the consequences these differing psychological valuations
have for individual’s choices of energy-efﬁcient products.
Political ideology provides a shared belief and value system
through which people view and react to the world around them
(13–15). In the United States, ideology is likely to be a major
determinant of the value that people place on protecting the
environment. Environmental concerns are part of a politically
liberal ideology in the United States and have been corre-
spondingly devalued by political conservatives. These different
ideological positions are marked by diverging beliefs about the
state of the world and the role of government in addressing
societal issues. Compared with those on the political left, right-
leaning individuals are more likely to dismiss concerns about
climate change and to favor policies that protect free market
opportunities for businesses by minimizing environmental
regulation (16–18). Although protecting the environment is
likely to be a priority for political liberals (a category that
typically corresponds to the Democratic Party in the United
States), political conservatives (a category that typically cor-
responds to the Republican Party in the United States) may
ﬁnd that this issue conﬂicts with the ideology to which they
subscribe. Therefore, appeals regarding energy efﬁciency that
label these choices as reﬂecting concern for the environment
might repel a substantial segment of the US population that
does not identify as politically liberal.
The United States presents a particularly informative context
to study the effect of political ideology on energy-efﬁciency atti-
tudes and choices. Because of the two-party political system in the
United States, the divergence on environmental issues produces
a salient in-group/out-group distinction in which value-based
concerns are likely to play an important role (19, 20). Because the
United States is the second largest producer of carbon emissions
in the world (21), it is crucial to understand what factors will affect
Americans’ adoption of energy-efﬁcient measures. More broadly,
this investigation is important because of the potential impact
that individual actions can have on reducing carbon emissions
globally (22, 23).
We ﬁrst investigated the attitudinal underpinnings of people’s
support for energy-efﬁcient technology, speciﬁcally whether the
concept of energy efﬁciency itself might be polarized along ideo-
logical lines. Although numerous ﬁndings demonstrate ideologi-
cal divides for climate change and other environmental issues in
the United States (e.g., refs. 16–18), whether such divides extend
to individuals’ attitudes about energy efﬁciency has not yet been
established. Although energy efﬁciency provides numerous ben-
eﬁts (including energy independence and reduced energy costs),
Author contributions: D.M.G., H.K., and R.P.L. designed research; D.M.G. performed re-
search; D.M.G. and R.P.L. analyzed data; and D.M.G., H.K., and R.P.L. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
See Commentary on page 9191.
1To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: denag@wharton.upenn.edu.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1218453110/-/DCSupplemental.
9314–9319 | PNAS | June 4, 2013 | vol. 110 | no. 23 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1218453110
its beneﬁt to the environment (i.e., reducing the level of carbon
dioxide emissions) may lead to ideological divides. We hypothe-
sized that the political polarization around environmental issues
in the United States will affect Americans’ support for investing
in energy-efﬁcient technology. Speciﬁcally, we expected that the
ideological difference in support for investment would result pri-
marily from those on the political right placing less psychological
value on reducing carbon emissions than those on the political left.
Study 1 provided an empirical test of whether political ideol-
ogy is associated with attitudes toward the development and use
of energy-efﬁcient technology in a US sample. Importantly, this
study investigated whether the (hypothesized) link between po-
litical ideology and support for energy efﬁciency results primarily
from the psychological value placed on environmental (reducing
carbon emissions), energy independence (reducing dependence
on foreign oil), or ﬁnancial issues (reducing energy costs). We
expected the ideological divide on energy efﬁciency would be
explained best by the divergent psychological value placed on the
environmental component of energy efﬁciency.
Building on the ﬁndings of study 1, study 2 examined how
these psychological valuations affect the demand for energy-
efﬁcient products (also in a US sample). We investigated how
labeling products with an environmental message affects peo-
ple’s actual decision to purchase an energy-saving product (i.e.,
to buy an energy-efﬁcient ﬂuorescent light bulb versus an in-
candescent light bulb). We expected that labeling the product as
an environmental choice would make it unattractive to those
who are more politically conservative, resulting in fewer choosing
to purchase the energy-efﬁcient option than if the environment
had not been made salient.
Experiments
Study 1: Attitudes Toward Investment in Energy Efﬁciency. Design.
Study 1 [n = 657 US participants; 49% male; ranging in age from
19–81 y: mean (M) = 44.62, SD = 13.94] examined whether there
is an ideological difference in individuals’ support for investment
in energy-efﬁcient technology and whether this difference is
driven by the importance placed on energy-related concerns (the
effect of energy use on the environment, energy independence,
and energy cost). We hypothesized that greater political con-
servatism would be associated with less support for investing in
energy efﬁciency. We expected that individuals who were more
conservative would place less psychological value on the envi-
ronmental issue of reducing carbon emissions, which should
mediate the relationship between political ideology and support
for investment in energy efﬁciency. We additionally expected
greater transideological appeal (i.e., less polarization) for the
psychological value placed on reducing dependence on foreign
oil and the ﬁnancial cost of energy for consumers.
Participants were provided with a short description of energy ef-
ﬁciency and answered questions about the psychological value they
placed on reducing carbon emissions that harm the environment,
reducing dependence on foreign oil, and reducing the ﬁnancial
cost of energy use to consumers. Participants indicated how
much they were in favor of investing in energy-efﬁcient tech-
nology (see Methods for a full description of study procedure
and measures).
Results.We assessed whether participants’ political leanings were
related to their support for investment in energy efﬁciency and
the importance they placed on energy-related concerns. Partic-
ipants’ political ideology composite of their ideological leanings
and political party identiﬁcation (see Methods for a full de-
scription; higher numbers indicate greater conservatism; scale
range = 1–7; M = 3.76, SD = 1.42) was entered as an in-
dependent variable in linear regression equations predicting the
extent to which individuals favored investment in energy-efﬁcient
technology and the value they placed on reducing carbon emis-
sions, reducing dependence on foreign oil, and reducing the cost
of energy use (Table 1). Each regression included the following
demographic controls: self-reported age, sex, education level,
and income, because these factors have been shown to correlate
with beliefs about global warming (18, 24). The order in which
participants answered the valuation questions and the order in
which they indicated their political ideology (Methods) did not
affect the relationship between political ideology and these
measures (Table S1).
As expected, the more conservative participants were, the less
they favored investing in energy-efﬁcient technology (Table 1).
With regard to individuals’ psychological valuation of the envi-
ronment, energy independence, and energy costs, all three
judgments were associated with participants’ political ideology:
The more conservative participants were, the less psychological
value they placed on all these concerns (Table 1). However, as
shown in Fig. 1, the ideological divide was greatest for reduction
of carbon emissions, indicating the polarizing nature of envi-
ronmental concerns (and the relatively broader appeal of energy
independence and cost concerns across ideological lines). In
additional analyses, we also included a sex × ideology interaction
term, because conservative males tend to express the greatest
denial of climate change (25). This interaction was a signiﬁcant
predictor for the valuation of carbon emission reductions but did
not predict investment in energy efﬁciency or ratings for the
other values; Table S1).
To examine whether the psychological value placed on the
reduction of carbon emissions is primarily responsible for the
relationship between political ideology and attitude toward in-
vestment in energy efﬁciency, we conducted bootstrap mediation
analyses (26) that allowed for the simultaneous examination of
the psychological value placed on the reduction of emissions,
dependence on foreign oil, and cost of energy use as explana-
tions for this relationship (see Table S2 for full mediation
results). Although all the measures were signiﬁcant mediators of
the link between ideology and support for investing in energy
efﬁciency, reducing emissions explained more of the variance in
Table 1. Linear regressions predicting how much participants favored investment in energy-efﬁcient technology
and how much they valued three features of energy efﬁciency (reduced carbon emissions, foreign oil dependence,
and energy costs) from the political ideology composite (centered: M = 3.76, SD = 1.42) and demographic controls
Predictor variables
Favor
investment
Standard
error
Carbon emission
reduction
Standard
error
Foreign oil
reduction
Standard
error
Cost
reduction
Standard
error
Ideology composite −0.24*** (0.03) −0.39*** (0.03) −0.10*** (0.03) −0.14*** (0.03)
Age 0.004 (0.003) 0.01* (0.004) 0.01*** (0.003) 0.01** (0.003)
Sex (male = 0; female = 1) 0.13 (0.09) 0.36* (0.10) 0.10 (0.08) 0.19* (0.08)
Education level −0.02 (0.03) −0.05 (0.04) −0.03 (0.03) −0.06 (0.03)
Income level 0.06 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05)
Constant 5.49*** (0.22) 5.23*** (0.25) 5.31*** (0.21) 5.56*** (0.20)
Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients (with SE in parentheses) are reported. Ideology composite: Higher numbers indicate greater
conservatism. Note: 31 participants were excluded from these analyses because they did not provide their income level (remaining n =
626). The results do not differ if these participants are included in the analyses.
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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this relationship than did reducing the dependence on foreign oil
[bootstrapped coefﬁcient (B) = −0.08, SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁ-
dence interval (CI) = −0.12 to −0.04] or reducing cost (B =
−0.08, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = −0.13 to −0.03), which did not differ
from one another (B = 0.00, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = −0.03 to 0.04).
This mediational analysis provided evidence that the ideological
difference in favoring investment in energy efﬁciency is driven
most strongly by the divergent psychological value placed on the
environmental issue of emission reduction.
Additional evidence for the polarizing effect of environmental
concerns comes from analyses that included the strength of
participants’ belief in global warming [which was negatively re-
lated to conservatism, r(657) = −0.53, P < 0.001]. When this
variable was included as a predictor of the three energy-related
concerns in the linear regressions described previously, the more
conservative participants were, the greater the psychological
value they placed on reducing dependence on foreign oil [B
(unstandardized regression coefﬁcient) = 0.09, SE = 0.03, t
(619) = 2.88, P = 0.004] and (nonsigniﬁcantly) on the cost of
energy use [B = 0.05, SE = 0.03, t(619) = 1.61, P = 0.11]. This
result indicates that, when their relatively lower concerns about
global warming are taken into account, the political right places
a greater psychological value than the left on energy in-
dependence and reduced energy costs. This reversal did not
occur for the reduction of carbon emissions [B = −0.01, SE = 0.03,
t(619) = −0.21, P = 0.84]. This result suggests that conservatives
may respond more positively to appeals for energy efﬁciency
based on cost and energy independence, and such appeals also
should resonate with liberals (as shown in Fig. 1).
Discussion. These results demonstrate that there are ideological
differences in the support for investments in energy efﬁciency in
the United States, with more politically conservative individuals
being less in favor of investing in energy-efﬁcient technology
than those who are more politically liberal. Moreover, this dif-
ference is driven primarily by the different psychological value
placed on reducing carbon emissions, with more conservative
individuals viewing this issue as less important than those who
are more liberal. The next study examines the consequences of
this differential psychological valuing of the environment on
individuals’ choices. Speciﬁcally, we investigated how labels
that reﬂect environmental concerns affect individuals’ choices
regarding the purchase of an energy-efﬁcient product when
people are aware of the cost savings that energy efﬁciency
can provide.
Study 2: Light Bulb Choice. Design. Study 2 (n = 210 participants
recruited from a pool of participants drawn from a US university
population; 61% female; ranging in age from 18 to 66 y: M =
22.36, SD = 7.04) examined how pairing a product with an en-
vironmental label affected people’s actual buying behavior and
whether the effect was moderated by their political leanings and
the upfront cost of the energy-efﬁcient option. This study thus
focuses on two potential roadblocks to the adoption of energy
efﬁciency in the United States: greater upfront costs for energy-
efﬁcient technology and the emphasis on the environment in
the promotion of energy efﬁciency. Study 1 demonstrated that
more conservative individuals’ lower support for investment in
energy-efﬁcient technology was based primarily on the lower
psychological value they placed on the environmental issue of
reducing carbon emissions. We thus hypothesized that labeling
an energy-efﬁcient light bulb as reﬂecting a concern with the
environment would deter its purchase by individuals who are
more politically conservative. We examined whether an aver-
sion to an environmental label would deter purchasing when
the energy-efﬁcient option had a greater upfront cost than an
incandescent bulb (as it typically does in the market) and when
it did not.
Participants were given $2 (which was separate from their
compensation for participating in the experiment) to purchase
a light bulb, and any money they did not spend on the light bulb
they kept for themselves. Their choice was between incandescent
and compact ﬂuorescent light (CFL) bulbs that produced equiv-
alent lumens (brightness). In one condition the bulbs had the same
price ($0.50), and in the other condition, the CFL bulb was more
expensive ($1.50) than the incandescent bulb ($0.50). Environ-
mental salience was manipulated by varying whether the purchase
of the CFL bulb came with a “Protect the Environment” sticker or
a blank sticker. Aside from the message, the stickers were iden-
tical. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the four
conditions (seeMethods for full description of the study procedure
and measures).
Across the conditions in this study, we held constant the
information presented about the two light bulb options. All
participants were provided with information about the energy-
efﬁciency beneﬁts of the CFL bulb compared with the incan-
descent bulb (e.g., the CFL bulb lasts for 9,000 more hours and
reduces energy cost by 75%). All the differences described con-
cerned energy use and cost; there was no explicit mention of any
environmental beneﬁts. Because environmental salience was ma-
nipulated via a superﬁcial feature of the product (the label) rather
than by information about the product’s speciﬁc environmental
beneﬁts, we can isolate the inﬂuence of psychological value-based
concerns on energy-efﬁcient choices when individuals have in-
formation just about the product’s energy and cost-saving beneﬁts.
Results Manipulation checks. Overall, the CFL bulb was seen as
superior to the incandescent bulb in function, savings, and en-
vironmental beneﬁt (P < 0.01; Table S3). Participants completed
these judgments after they had made their choice as to which
light bulb to purchase. The light bulb purchase was seen as more
expressive of one’s values when the sticker contained the envi-
ronmental message (M = 3.60, SD = 1.53) than when it was blank
(M = 3.13, SD = 1.51, t(208) = 2.24, P = 0.026). As in study 1, the
participants who were more conservative were less likely to en-
dorse a belief in global warming [B = −0.28, SE = 0.08, t(200) =
−3.56, P < 0.001], indicating that conservatives were less con-
cerned about this environmental issue than were liberals.
Light bulb choice.When the bulbs were the same price, the content
of the label had no effect. All participants (except one) chose the
CFL bulb, suggesting that long-term economic considerations
dominated their choice process. Indeed, participants rated the
CFL bulb as offering greater savings when the bulbs were the
same price than when the CFL bulb had a greater upfront cost
[MEqualCost = 6.03, SD = 1.23 vs. MUnequalCost = 5.04, SD = 1.81,
t(208) = 4.65, P < 0.001], and they viewed the incandescent
bulb as offering lesser savings [MEqualCost = 2.70, SD = 1.63 vs.
MUnequalCost = 3.43, SD = 2.00, t(208) = 2.92, P = 0.004].
In contrast, when the CFL bulb was three times more expen-
sive than the incandescent bulb, environmental salience inﬂu-
enced choice differently based on political ideology (see Table 2
for full logistic regression results and Tables S4 and S5 for logistic
regression results for the label conditions separately). The po-
litical ideology measure was a composite of the standardized
scores for their ideological leanings and political party afﬁliation
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Carbon 
Emissions 
Foreign Oil Energy Cost 
Perceived Value 
(1-7) 
Type of Reduction 
More Liberal (-1 SD) 
More Conservative(+1 SD) 
Fig. 1. The psychological value (± SE) participants placed on reducing car-
bon emissions, reducing dependence on foreign oil, and reducing the cost of
energy use based on their political ideology (±1 SD from the mean).
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(see Methods for a full description; higher numbers indicate
greater conservatism; M = −0.01, SD = 0.83). In addition to the
linear ideology term, we also included a quadratic term to ex-
amine whether political moderates chose the CFL bulb at a rate
similar to that of more liberal participants, at a rate similar to
that of more conservative participants, or at a rate in between.
Although political moderates’ attitudes toward environmental
issues fall between those of liberals and conservatives (18),
whether their choices would follow this linear pattern was un-
known. As shown in Table 2, both the linear and quadratic in-
teraction terms were signiﬁcant predictors of light-bulb choice.
As shown by the predicted probabilities of choosing the more
expensive CFL bulb (Fig. 2), more politically moderate and
conservative participants were deterred from purchasing the CFL
bulb when it had an environmental label. We conducted ﬂood-
light regression analyses (27, 28) that assessed whether light-bulb
choice based on label varied signiﬁcantly across the ideological
spectrum from −1 to +1 in increments of 0.2 (i.e., the simple
effect of label at each speciﬁed level of ideology; see Table S6 for
full results). Participants were signiﬁcantly less likely to purchase
the CFL bulb if it came with an environmental label when their
score on the linear ideology composite ranged from 0 to 0.8 (P <
0.03; both −0.2 and 1 were marginally signiﬁcant). All other val-
ues were not signiﬁcant (P > 0.20). These results show that the
more moderate and conservative participants preferred to bear
a long-term ﬁnancial cost to avoid purchasing an item associated
with valuing environmental protection.
Importantly, participants’ choice of light bulb was not ex-
plained by the perceived environmental beneﬁt offered by the
CFL bulb, because the ratings of the incandescent and CFL bulbs
on this dimension were not affected by the label, by participants’
political ideology (either linear or quadratic), or by their in-
teraction (Table S7). This result rules out the alternative expla-
nation that the presence of an environmental label increases how
much participants think the energy-efﬁcient bulb beneﬁts the
environment (rather than simply making the environment sa-
lient). Furthermore, there also was no difference in the perceived
quality of the incandescent and CFL bulbs across the different
conditions and political ideologies (Table S7).
Discussion. These ﬁndings indicate that connecting energy-efﬁ-
cient products to environmental concerns can negatively affect
the demand for these products, speciﬁcally among persons in the
United States who are more politically conservative. Although
the majority of participants, regardless of ideology, selected the
more expensive energy-efﬁcient light bulb when it was unlabeled,
the more moderate and conservative participants were less likely
to purchase this option when an environmental label was at-
tached to it. In addition, it might seem surprising that the envi-
ronmental label did not produce a large increase in preference
for the energy-efﬁcient CFL bulb among more liberal individu-
als. We speculate that these participants may associate energy-
efﬁcient options with environmental beneﬁts spontaneously and
do not need a label to call the beneﬁts to their attention.
These results also speak to the role of ﬁnancial incentives as
a way of increasing demand for energy-efﬁcient options. When
the CFL bulb was discounted to match the price of the in-
candescent bulb, psychological value-based concerns did not in-
ﬂuence choice. All participants except one picked the discounted
CFL bulb, suggesting that when energy-efﬁcient options do not
require larger upfront costs than standard options, psychological
valuations are less likely to dissuade people from choosing en-
ergy efﬁciency. However, until equal upfront costs become a
reality (such as through long-term loans for energy-efﬁciency
upgrades or the reduction of costs through economies of
scale), labeling energy-efﬁcient choices as reﬂecting environ-
mental concerns has the potential of deterring some individ-
uals from selecting energy-efﬁcient options.
General Discussion
The present results demonstrate that there are ideological dif-
ferences in attitudes toward energy efﬁciency in the United
States. More politically conservative individuals are less in favor
of investing in energy efﬁciency than are those who are more
politically liberal, a ﬁnding driven primarily by the polarized
psychological valuation of carbon emissions reduction. Although
one of the primary beneﬁts of energy-efﬁcient options is that
they place less strain on the environment, not everyone values
environmental protection. These differing psychological valu-
ations have consequences for the adoption of energy efﬁciency,
because promoting environmental protection can decrease the
demand for energy efﬁciency among nonliberals. In particular,
our results indicate that in the United States (one of the largest
producers of carbon emissions in the world), those on the po-
litical right will avoid purchasing more expensive energy-efﬁcient
options when the choice is reﬂective of concern for the envi-
ronment, even though they might have otherwise purchased
these options.
The generalizability of these results to understanding attitudes
towards and choices regarding energy efﬁciency in other coun-
tries and cultures depends on whether psychologically valuing
environmental protection is linked strongly with speciﬁc ideolo-
gies or political parties. For example, although Europeans tend
to be more concerned about climate change than Americans
Table 2. Logistic regression predicting the probability of purchasing the CFL bulb based on
label and political ideology (unequal-cost condition only)
Predictor variables B SE Wald P value eB (odds ratio)
Ideology composite (linear) −0.48 0.32 2.29 0.130 0.62
Label (−1 = blank label; 1 = env label) −0.67 0.29 5.45 0.020 0.51
Label × ideology composite (linear) −0.63 0.32 3.95 0.047 0.53
Ideology composite (quadratic) 0.31 0.31 0.98 0.322 1.36
Label × ideology composite (quadratic) 0.69 0.31 4.84 0.028 1.98
Constant −0.00 0.29 0.00 0.99 1.00
The ideology composite comprises standardized political ideology and party afﬁliation scores (higher numbers
indicate greater conservatism). B, unstandardized regression coefﬁcient.
Fig. 2. The predicted probability of participants choosing the more expensive
CFL bulb based on their political ideology (higher numbers indicate greater
conservatism) and whether an environmental value was salient. The x-axis
contains values from −1 to 1 from the mean of the political ideology composite.
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(29), there is still a left–right ideological divide on environmental
issues in the European Union (30), suggesting that the present
ﬁndings may generalize to these countries. More abstractly,
making the environment salient could negatively impact the
adoption of energy efﬁciency whenever valuing environmental
protection is viewed as undesirable. In the United States, the
political polarization surrounding climate change (16–18) pro-
vides one means of operationalizing the value placed on envi-
ronmental concerns. More research is needed to examine how
the relationship between political ideology and the valuation of
environmental protection varies cross-culturally and inﬂuences
attitudes towards and choices about energy efﬁciency.
One open question is what underlies this ideological divide on
energy efﬁciency when it is associated with environmental pro-
tection. There are a number of possible reasons for this differ-
ence. Political conservatism is associated with a preference for the
status quo (14), traditionalism (31), and a lesser reliance on harm
and fairness principles in moral domains (32). Environmental
protection (particularly in the context of proposed “solutions” to
the problems created by climate change) typically challenges the
economic status quo and tradition (10, 17), and relies on harm/
fairness notions of morality (33). Hence any or all of these basic
psychological factors might contribute to the present ﬁndings.
Although the psychological value placed on reducing carbon
emissions is divided along political lines in the United States,
study 1 demonstrated there is greater transideological agreement
about the psychological value placed on saving money and se-
curing energy independence. Focusing on these issues that have
a broader appeal is one possible solution to the environmental
polarization problem. Indeed, when only cost information was
available to participants in study 2 (i.e., the blank-label con-
ditions), there were no ideological differences in the selection of
the energy-efﬁcient option. Alternatively, there may be sources
of political common ground with regard to the environment
itself, because framing environmental protection in terms of
psychological values that appeal to those on the political right
(such as purity or patriotism) increases concern for the envi-
ronment among political conservatives (17, 33). Future research
should identify whether tapping these less polarizing concerns,
morals, and values can bridge the ideological gap in the will-
ingness to pay for energy-efﬁcient options.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate the inﬂuence of framing and con-
textual effects on people’s selection of energy-efﬁcient options
(34, 35) and the importance of individual-level, behavioral fac-
tors in adopting energy-efﬁcient measures (22, 23). These results
also speak to the importance of recognizing that people’s
choices can be based on noneconomic sources of value. The
present results complement previous research demonstrating the
inﬂuence of identity-related concerns on people’s economic
decisions (36, 37), because people make choices that align with
important identities and provide distance from unwanted iden-
tities (38–40). Our results demonstrate that individuals will
forego economically beneﬁcial options if these options promote
a value that is in conﬂict with their political ideology.
Although much attention has been given to information gaps
and lack of immediate concern about the impact of climate change
as reasons why people do not choose energy-efﬁcient options de-
spite their long-term economic beneﬁts (3–7), this research iden-
tiﬁes an additional roadblock to the widespread adoption of
energy efﬁciency in the United States: the value individuals place
on the environment. This psychological valuation is based on
people’s political ideology, and affects their energy-efﬁciency
preferences (even when provided with information about the
economic beneﬁts of energy efﬁciency). When energy efﬁciency
is promoted as reﬂecting environmental concern, individuals’
energy-efﬁcient choices can be polarized along ideological lines.
Methods
Study 1. Participants. Participants in the experiment (n = 657 individuals who
reside in the United States; 49% male; age range, 19–81 y: M = 44.62, SD =
13.94) were recruited via the Clear Voice survey service (whose research
panels meet the Code of Standards of the Council of American Survey Research
Organizations; www.clearvoicesurvey.com) and participated in the experiment
in exchange for monetary compensation.
Procedures. At the beginning of the study, participants completed an in-
structional attention check (adapted from ref. 41). Differing from previous
uses of these attention checks, participants were not excluded if they failed
to answer the question correctly. Instead, they were informed their answer
was incorrect and were not allowed to continue to the study until they
responded correctly. Participants then were provided with a short de-
scription of energy efﬁciency (i.e., “Technology is considered energy efﬁ-
cient when it uses less energy to produce the same level of performance”).
Valuation. After reading the description of energy efﬁciency, participants
indicated “how much each of the following is an important reason to invest
in energy-efﬁcient technology”: the technology’s ability to reduce “the level
of carbon emissions that harm the environment,” “dependence on foreign
oil,” and “the ﬁnancial cost of energy use to consumers” (presented in
a random order). The scales were anchored at 1 (not at all important) to
7 (very important).
The next set of questions asked participants about the extent to which
they thought that they individually, Americans, and the US government
(presented in this ﬁxed order) had a “moral obligation” to reduce “the level
of carbon emissions that harm the environment,” “dependence on foreign
oil,” and “the ﬁnancial cost of energy use to consumers” (presented in
a random order). Participants answered the identical set of questions with
regard to how much they individually, Americans, and the US government
“would beneﬁt from” these three reductions. The order in which partic-
ipants answered these two sets of questions (moral obligation and beneﬁt)
was counterbalanced. We collapsed across targets (self, Americans, US
government) and questions (importance, moral obligation, and beneﬁt) to
form composite measures for the value placed on reducing carbon emissions
(α = 0.93; M = 5.60, SD = 1.34), dependence on foreign oil (α = 0.83; M =
5.86, SD = 1.01), and cost of energy use (α = 0.79; M = 5.81, SD = 0.98).
Support for Investment.After completing these questions, participants indicated
how much they were in favor of “investing in the development and use of
energy-efﬁcient technology” with regard to themselves individually, Ameri-
cans, the US government, and US businesses (α = 0.83; M = 5.85, SD = 1.12).
Political Ideology. Participants indicated how much they identiﬁed as being
politically liberal or conservative (i) in general, (ii) on economic issues, and
(iii) on social issues, on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).
The midpoint of the scale was labeled as moderate. Participants provided
their responses to these questions either at the beginning of the study
(before reading the description of energy efﬁciency) or at the end (after
indicating how much they favored investing in energy-efﬁcient technology).
At the conclusion of the study, participants indicated the extent to which
they identiﬁed with four political groups: Democrats, Independents,
Republicans, and the Tea Party on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
The ideology measure was a composite of both these political ideology and
party afﬁliation measures (see ref. 42): the three items assessing ideology
(α = 0.93; M = 4.10, SD = 1.51) and how much participants identiﬁed with
Democrats (reverse-scored), Republicans, and the Tea Party (a faction within
the Republican party; α = 0.70;M = 3.40, SD = 1.58). The composite ideology
measure had good reliability (α = 0.87;M = 3.76, SD = 1.42); higher numbers
indicated greater conservatism.
The study concluded with participants indicating how much they agreed
with statements related to global warming (carbon emissions will heat up the
atmosphere, changing human behavior can reduce global warming, and
preventing global warming is important; α = 0.93). They then provided their
demographic information (age, sex, education level, and income level).
Study 2. Participants. Individuals (n = 210, 61% female; age range, 18–66 y;
M = 22.36, SD = 7.04) participated in laboratory experiments at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania in exchange for monetary compensation ($10 for
a 1-h session).
Procedures. On entering the laboratory, participants were seated at an in-
dividual cubicle in which the 60-W incandescent light bulb and the 13-W CFL
bulb were displayed. The two bulbs were made by the same manufacturer. In
front of the CFL bulb, there was either a blank sticker (blank-label condition)
or a sticker that read “Protect the Environment” (environmental-label con-
dition). The stickers were otherwise identical.
Participants read that they would have a choice of purchasing one of the
two light bulbs shown in their cubicle and learned that they had been allotted
an additional $2, completely separate from the compensation for their
participation, which they would use to purchase one of the two light bulbs to
take home with them. Participants were informed that they would keep any
portion of the $2 that they did not spend on the light-bulb purchase.
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Participants then were provided with information about the similarities
(in lighting power and quality; use in standard sockets) and differences (in
energy efﬁciency) between the two bulbs. Participants were informed that
the CFL bulb was more energy efﬁcient (“It uses less energy to produce the
same amount of light”), that it would last 9,000 hours longer than the in-
candescent bulb, and that it would reduce energy costs by 75% compared
with the incandescent bulb.
The relative cost of the light bulbs was manipulated in two conditions.
Participants either learned that the cost of the bulbs was the same (both the
incandescent and the CFL bulb cost $0.50, because of the availability of
discounted CFL bulbs) or that the CFL bulb was more expensive (priced at
$1.50, compared with the $0.50 incandescent bulb). Participants were told
that they had to purchase one of the two bulbs and were reminded how
much money they would be able to keep for themselves if they bought
either bulb ($1.50 or $0.50, respectively).
For the manipulation of environmental salience, participants were told
that if they chose the CFL bulb, they would receive either the blank sticker
(blank label) or the Protect the Environment sticker (environmental label)
displayed in their cubicle. Participants were assigned randomly to the cost and
label conditions; however, because of a procedural error, more participants
were run in the blank-label condition (n = 117) than in the environmental-
label condition (n = 93).
Immediately before participants made their choice, they were provided
with a table summarizing the similarities and differences between the two
light bulbs. Participants then made their bulb selection.
Value expression and light bulb evaluation. After making their choice, partic-
ipants were asked if they were to buy a CFL bulb with a blank or Protect the
Environment sticker, how much this choice would express to others who they
were, their values, and their political beliefs, as well as how much it would
afﬁrm them (presented in a counterbalanced order). These measures were
combined into a value expression composite (α = 0.91). Participants also
evaluated each bulb with regard to its lighting power, lighting quality,
monetary savings, and beneﬁt to the environment. The lighting power and
quality measures were combined into overall measures of light-bulb func-
tion (incandescent bulb: α = 0.88; CFL bulb: α = 0.81).
Global warming and political ideology. Participants completed a three-item
measure of their beliefs about global warming (same as in study 1; α = 0.80).
As in study 1, the ideology measure was a composite of how participants
identiﬁed themselves ideologically and their party afﬁliation. Participants
indicated how much they identiﬁed as politically liberal or conservative in
general, on economic issues, and on social issues on a scale from 1 (very
liberal) to 7 (very conservative). The midpoint of the scale was labeled
moderate (α = 0.81; M = 3.43, SD = 1.26). For afﬁliation, they indicated
the political party they most identiﬁed with: 1 = Democrat (55%), 2 = in-
dependent (22%), and 3 = Republican (20%). The afﬁliation measure was
treated as a three-point scale (M = 1.64, SD = 0.80). The composite ideology
score was computed by averaging the standardized score for the three
ideology measures and the one afﬁliation measure (α = 0.86;M = -0.01, SD =
0.83). The participants who identiﬁed as “other” (4%) were not included in
the composite score.
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